Abstract-In this paper, we investigate a general nonlinear model of opinion dynamics in which both state-dependent susceptibility to persuasion and antagonistic interactions are considered. According to the existing literature and socio-psychological theories, we examine three specializations of state-dependent susceptibility, that is, stubborn positives scenario, stubborn neutrals scenario, and stubborn extremists scenario. Interactions among agents form a signed graph, in which positive and negative edges represent friendly and antagonistic interactions, respectively. Based on Perron-Frobenius property of eventually positive matrices and LaSalle invariance principle, we conduct a comprehensive theoretical analysis of the generalized nonlinear opinion dynamics. We obtain some sufficient conditions such that the states of all agents converge into the subspace spanned by the right positive eigenvector of an eventually positive matrix. When there exists at least one entry of the right positive eigenvector which is not equal to one, the derived results can be used to describe different levels of an opinion. Finally, we present two examples to demonstrate the effectiveness of the theoretical findings.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE study of opinion dynamics has attracted much attention in recent years. Based on some social psychology theories such as social comparison theory [1] , cognitive dissonance theory [2] and balance theory [3] , [4] , various mathematical models have been presented to model the evolution of opinion forming [5] - [12] . Among these models, the basis is DeGroot model [5] , which is a discrete-time and weighted averaging model. The corresponding continuous-time version of DeGroot model was studied in [13] . The system matrix of DeGroot model is the row-stochastic adjacency matrix of an interaction graph, and cannot change with the states. Moreover, DeGroot model cannot model social behavior of stubborn agents, which is often hard to be affected by other agents. In [6] DeGroot model, in which some agents' states are unchanged, was investigated.
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agents cannot change with time and do not depend on current opinion or attitude. Various extensions of Friedkin-Johnsen model have been considered in [9] - [12] . A typical opinion model with state-dependent interactions is the bounded confidence model [14] - [20] . This model assumes that two agents can interact with each other when they are close enough. Some special bounded confidence models have been studied in [21] - [23] .
Recently, Amelkin et al. [24] proposed a continuous-time nonlinear model of polar opinion dynamics in which the agents' susceptibilities to persuasion depend on the agents' current opinion or attitude at hand, and interactions among agents are cooperative. According to different theories of social psychology, they investigated three specialized scenarios, that is, stubborn extremists, stubborn positives and stubborn neutrals. The scenario with stubborn extremists, based on social-psychological references [25] - [27] , assumes that the extreme opinions are resistant to change and neutral opinions will be attracted by extreme opinions, while the scenario with stubborn positives, based on [8] , is a special version of model with stubborn extremists. The scenario with stubborn neutrals, based on social comparison theory [1] and social norms [8] , supposes that the extreme opinions are more likely to change than the neutral opinions. Using the non-smooth analysis tool, they made a thorough theoretical analysis of the novel opinion dynamics model in [24] .
In this paper, we will study a generalized nonlinear opinion dynamics which includes both state-dependent susceptibility to persuasion and antagonistic interactions. Cooperative and antagonistic interactions usually coexist in social networks [28] - [30] . The signed graphs are often used to describe the cooperative and antagonistic interactions in social networks, with positive and negative edges denoting respectively the cooperative and antagonistic interactions. In social networks, the signed graphs are generally structurally balanced [3] in the sense that all nodes of the graph can be divided into two subsets, where the edges in each subset are positive and the edges connecting the two subsets are negative. Based on the balance theory [3] , the bipartite consensus for structurally balanced signed graphs has been investigated in [31] - [37] . Generally speaking, when the signed graph is structurally balanced, the bipartite consensus problem can be transformed to a classical consensus or synchronization problem. However, when the signed graph is not structurally balanced, one should not expect the network to achieve bipartite consensus. Instead, the unanimity of opinion over a signed graph was studied in [38] when the adjacency matrix satisfies the eventually positive property [39] - [41] .
Our introduced model can be seen as a generalization of the opinion forming models in [24] , [38] . Comparing it with the model in [24] , our model can deal with the antagonistic interactions and accurately describe the degree of agent's opinion. For example, ten people voted for the Green Party in an election, but they did not support it at the same level. Hence, it is reasonable to use different positive or negative values to differentiate the opinion of these electors.
Comparing it with the model in [38] , our model introduces state-dependent susceptibility to persuasion. This modification makes the dynamics of our model become more complex than the one in [38] . There also exist some unobservable behaviors in the linear model in [38] (see Example 2 in Section IV for details).
This paper considers three specializations of state-dependent susceptibility which are drawn from [24] . We assume that all eigenvalues of the coupled system matrix have non-positive real parts, and the dominant eigenvalue is real and the corresponding eigenvector is a positive vector. We consider the directed and undirected signed graphs, respectively. Two cases about the adjacency matrix of a signed graph are examined: 1) the adjacency matrix is eventually positive; 2) the adjacency matrix is not eventually positive, but there exists a matrix such that the adjacency matrix has Perron-Frobenius property by adding it. When the dominant eigenvalue of the coupled system matrix is zero, utilizing Perron-Frobenius property of matrix with some negative entries and LaSalle invariance principle, we obtain sufficient conditions such that the states of the studied model will converge into the subspace spanned by the right positive eigenvector of the adjacency matrix. On the other hand, when the dominant eigenvalue of the coupled system matrix is non-positive, we derive sufficient conditions such that the general equilibrium points of the underlying model are asymptotically stable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents notations and the problem statement. Section III undertakes a comprehensive theoretical analysis of three specializations of state-dependent susceptibility, that is, stubborn positives scenario, stubborn neutrals scenario, and stubborn extremists scenario in generalized nonlinear opinion dynamics. Section IV gives two numerical examples to verify the obtained theoretical results. Finally, Section V summarizes our conclusions and describes future work. Besides, Appendix A provides some definitions and facts about signed graphs and Appendix B states some results of eventually positive matrices and Perron-Frobenius property, followed by some lemmas about positive semidefinite matrices given in Appendix C.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notations
Let 1 (0) be a vector of appropriate dimension with all elements equal to 1(0). Let R
n }, and ||x|| ∞ := max i |x i | which is the infinity norm of x. For vectors x, y ∈ R n , x < y if x i < y i , i = 1, 2, · · · , n. For a real square matrix
, then A is called a nonnegative (positive) matrix. For a real symmetric square matrix B, B 0 ( 0) means that B is positive semidefinite (negative semidefinite), and B 0 (≺ 0) means that B is positive definite (negative definite). I represents an identity matrix of appropriate dimension. Let sp(A) = {λ 1 (A), · · · , λ n (A)} denote the spectrum of matrix A, and max{λ 1 (A), · · · , λ n (A)} denote the dominant eigenvalue of matrix A, where λ i (A), i = 1, · · · , n are the eigenvalues of A. ρ(A) stands for the spectral radius of matrix A, which is the smallest real positive number such that ρ(A) ≥ |λ i (A)|, ∀i = 1, · · · , n. Denote the transpose of matrix A by A T , and let
. A matrix A is irreducible if and only if it cannot be transformed into a block upper-triangular form by simultaneous row/column permutations.
B. Problem Statements
Consider a general model of opinion dynamics as follows:
where 
where
If there do not exist the susceptibility functions, then the generalized opinion dynamics (2) becomesẋ = Ex, which was investigated in [38] . However, when there exist the susceptibility functions a i (x i ) ∈ [−1, 1], the dynamic behavior of the generalized opinion dynamics (2) will become more complex when compared toẋ = Ex. If Σ = I and the adjacency matrix B (b ij ∈ {0, 1}) is row-stochastic, then the generalized opinion dynamics (2) becomes the model (1) considered in [24] . In [24] , the dynamic behavior of its model (1) was studied for some special susceptibility functions, that is, stubborn positives scenario A(x) = 0.5(I − diag(x)), stubborn neutrals scenario A(x) = diag(x) 2 , and stubborn extremists scenario A(x) = (I − diag(x)
2 ). Our model (2) can be viewed as a generalization of the models considered in [24] , [38] . In the next section, we will study the dynamic behavior of the generalized opinion dynamics (2) under three special scenarios, that is, stubborn extremists, stubborn positives, and stubborn neutrals. In this paper, we assume that matrix E is eventually positive and all eigenvalues have non-positive real parts. Precisely, we adopt the following two assumptions.
Assumption 1: The adjacency matrix B is eventually positive, and
Assumption 2: The adjacency matrix B is not eventually positive, and E can be represented as E = C − dI, where C = B +D is eventually positive, D = dI −Σ, and d ≥ ρ(C).
III. ANALYSIS OF GENERALIZED OPINION DYNAMICS
This section will study the dynamic behavior of the generalized opinion dynamics (2) under three special scenarios (stubborn extremists, stubborn positives, and stubborn neutrals) respectively. Before moving forward, we first consider equilibrium points of the generalized opinion dynamics (2) .
All equilibrium points of the generalized opinion dynamics (2) satisfy A(x)Ex = 0. Suppose that
, and all equilibrium points satisfy Ex = 0. Second, if I a,0 = ∅ and I a,+ = ∅, then there exists a permutation matrix P such that
where dim y 1 = |I a,0 |. Theṅ
where A 2 (y 2 ) > 0. Hence, all equilibrium points of (4) satisfy y * 1 ∈ {s | a i (s) = 0, ∀i} |Ia,0| ,Ē 22 y * 2 = −Ē 21 y * 1 . In this case, all equilibrium points are x * = P T y * . Third, if I a,+ = ∅, then all equilibrium points of the generalized opinion dynamics (2) are x * ∈ {s | a i (s) = 0, ∀i} N .
A. Stubborn Positives Scenario
This subsection focuses on the dynamic behavior of the generalized opinion dynamics (2) under the stubborn positives scenario, that is, A(x) = 0.5(I − diag(x)).
Theorem 1: Suppose that Assumption 1 (Assumption 2) holds, G(B) is the signed digraph, and there exists a positive diagonal matrix Γ = diag{γ 1 , · · · , γ N } such that H(ΓE) 0 and rankH(ΓE) = rankE. 2) If I a,0 = ∅, I a,+ = ∅, there exists a permutation matrix P such that the network (2) has the form of (4),Ē 22 is nonsingular, and
, where x * = P T y * , and y * is the equilibrium point of (4). 
3) If
Proof: First, we consider the case that Assumption 1 holds. The partition of the state space is illustrated in Fig. 1 . 1) Because B is an eventually positive matrix, by Lemma 2, we have that matrix B is irreducible, ρ(B) is a simple positive eigenvalue of B and the corresponding right eigenvector v r is positive. When Assumption 1 holds, Let
Then V (x) is positive definite in S(ε). For all x ∈ S(ε), the time derivative of V (x) along (2) is given bẏ
where e i is the ith row of matrix E. Since H(ΓE) 0, we
for all x ∈ S(ε). Hence, S(ε) is positively invariant with respect to (2) . By Lemma 4,V = 0 if and only if H(ΓE)x = 0. Because rankH(ΓE) = rankE, H(ΓE) and E have the same null space. Thus,V = 0 if and only if Ex = 0. If
, ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , thenV = 0 if and only if x = 0. By LaSalle invariance principle, the solution of (2) with initial condition x(0) ∈ S(ε) converges into P(ε). If x(0) is sufficiently close to 1, then ε → 0. Therefore, for all
, the solution of (2) satisfies x i (t) ≡ 1, ∀i ∈ I a,0 . P is a permutation matrix such that
Hence,ẏ
where y 2 ∈ [−1, 1 − ε] |Ia,+| . SinceĒ 22 is nonsingular, we have that det(Ē 22 ) = 0 and there exists a unique y * 2 such thatĒ 22 
|Ia,+| . The time derivative of V (s) along (7) is calculated as follows:
whereē 22i is the ith row of matrixĒ 22 . Since H(ΓE) 0 and H(Γ 2Ē22 ) is a principal submatrix of H(ΓE), we have H(Γ 2Ē22 ) 0. Hence,
|Ia,+| is positively invariant with respect to (7) . By LaSalle invariance principle, the solution of (7) with initial condition
There exists a permutation matrix P such that the network (2) takes the following forṁ
Then we can geṫ
Because 
is the intersection point of the line αv r with [−1, 1] N . Similar to the arguments presented in 2), we can obtain that every solution starting in S 0 (ε) approaches x * = βv r , where β = 1 ||vr||∞ . When ε → 0 + , we can get that every solution starting in {x | x i = 1, ∀i ∈ J , x i ∈ [−1, 1), ∀i / ∈ J } tends to βv r . Second, we consider the case that Assumption 2 holds. Because C = B + D is eventually positive, by Lemma 2, matrix C is irreducible, ρ(C) is a simple positive eigenvalue of C and the corresponding right eigenvector v r is positive. Hence, E = C − dI has the eigenvalue ρ(C) − d with an eigenvector v r . If d = ρ(C), then all eigenvalues of E have non-positive real parts, and 0 is a simple eigenvalue of E with a right positive eigenvector v r . If d > ρ(C), then all eigenvalues of E have negative real parts, and its dominant eigenvalue has the right positive eigenvector v r .
On this basis, one can use the similar methods presented above to acquire the results in 1), 2) and 3) in the case of Assumption 2, and details are omitted here for brevity. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1: Suppose that Assumption 1 (Assumption 2) holds and the signed graph G(B) is undirected. 2) If I a,0 = ∅, I a,+ = ∅, there exists a permutation matrix P such that the network (2) has the form of (4),Ē 22 is nonsingular, and
, ∀i / ∈ I a,0 }, where x * = P T y * , and y * is the equilibrium points of (4).
Proof: Because the signed graph G(B) is undirected, it can be known that matrix E is symmetric and diagonalizable. By Remark 3 given in Subsection III-B, we have H(E) 0 and rankH(E) = rankE. Hence, it follows from Theorem 1 that 1), 2) and 3) of this corollary hold. This completes the proof of Corollary 1.
The stubborn positives scenario describes the case that the agents only at one end of the opinion spectrum are stubborn. For this scenario, an example about two smartphone brands was presented in [24] . The opinion values 1 and −1 mean an aggressive marketing of the brand and a neutral marketing of the brand, respectively. Opinion −1 may be changed by other opinions, but opinion 1 is stubborn and cannot be influenced by other opinions. The above Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 show that the states of the generalized opinion dynamics (2) are convergent under different initial conditions.
B. Stubborn Neutrals Scenario
This subsection examines the dynamic behavior of the generalized opinion dynamics (2) under the stubborn neutrals scenario, that is, A(x) = diag(x) 2 . Lemma 1: Consider the generalized opinion dynamics (2) under the stubborn neutrals scenario A(x) = diag(x) 2 . Then x(t) has nonnegative derivatives.
Proof: Let x t (z) be the solution of the generalized opinion dynamics (2) with initial condition z ∈ R N . Define
2 Ex, where Dx t (z) is the Jacobian matrix. Then M (t) satisfies the variational equatioṅ
where DF (x) is the Jacobian matrix. It is easy to get
We can obtain that M (t) = 0 when x = 0. Hence, M (t) ≥ 0, that is, x(t) has nonnegative derivatives.
Theorem 2: Suppose that Assumption 1 (Assumption 2) holds, G(B) is the signed digraph, and there exists a positive 
Proof: First, we consider the case that Assumption 1 holds. The corresponding state space is partitioned as depicted in Fig. 2 .
When σ i = σ j = ρ(B), ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , and B is eventually positive matrix, by Lemma 2, we have that matrix B is irreducible, ρ(B) is a simple positive eigenvalue of B and the corresponding right eigenvector v r is positive. In this case, the equilibrium points are x * = αv r , α ∈ − 1 ||vr||∞ , 1 ||vr||∞ . Specifically, if I a,0 = ∅, then all equilibrium points satisfy Ex = 0. Hence, the equilibrium points are x * = αv r . If I a,+ = ∅, then the equilibrium points are x * = 0. If I a,0 = ∅ and I a,+ = ∅, then there exists a permutation matrix P such thatĒ
and all equilibrium points are x * = P T y * , y * 1 = 0,Ē 22 y * 2 = 0. IfĒ 22 is nonsingular, then y * 2 = 0 and x * = 0. Assume thatĒ 22 is singular, and there exists a nonzero vector ξ such thatĒ 22 
Since there exists a positive diagonal matrix Γ such that H(ΓE) 0, and rankH(ΓE) = rankE, H(ΓE) and E have the same null space. As P is a permutation matrix, H(P ΓEP T ) and P EP T have the same null space. Suppose thatΓ = diag{Γ 1 ,Γ 2 } = P ΓP T . Then
. This is a contradiction with the assumption that ξ is a nonzero vector. Therefore, if I a,0 = ∅ and I a,+ = ∅, then the equilibrium points are x * = 0. If σ i = σ j > ρ(B), ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , then we can use the same method to obtain that the equilibrium points are
So V (x) is continuously differentiable in S + = [ε, 1] N . By Lemma 1, x(t) has nonnegative derivatives, that is,ẋ i ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, · · · , N . For all x ∈ S + , the time derivative of V (x) along (2) is given bẏ
for all x ∈ S + . Hence, S + is positively invariant with respect to (2) .V = 0 if and only if
. By LaSalle invariance principle, the solution of (2) with initial condition x(0) ∈ S + converges into P + . Hence, if
So V (x) is continuously differentiable in S − = [−1, −ε] N . Because x(t) has nonnegative derivatives according to Lemma 1, the time derivative of V (x) along (2) is found to beV
for all x ∈ S − . Hence, S − is positively invariant with respect to (2) .V = 0 if and only if x ∈ P − = x x = αv r , α ∈ −
. From LaSalle invariance principle, it follows that the solution of (2) with initial condition x(0) < 0 converges into P − .
3) Let
it can be seen that sgn(x i (t)) = sgn(x i (0)). For arbitrary x(0) ∈ S ± with x(0) = 0, without loss of generality, assume that
where x(t) is the solution of the generalized opinion dynamics (2) with initial condition x(0), and ε is a sufficiently small positive constant. Let
for all x ∈ S ± S(ε). Since x T H(ΓE)x = 0, x ∈ S ± if and only if x = 0,V < 0 for all x ∈ S ± S(ε). Hence, V (x) is strictly monotonically decreasing on S ± S(ε), and V (x) has a minimum value atx withx i = 0, i = 1, · · · , l 2 ,x i = −ε, i = l 2 +1, · · · , N . Moreover,V (x) < 0. Thus, the solution of (2) N . Second, we turn to the case that Assumption 2 holds. Since E = C −dI, C = B +D is eventually positive, and d ≥ ρ(C), with the above-presented similar method we arrive at that the equilibrium points are x * = αv r , α ∈ − 1 ||vr||∞ , 1 ||vr||∞ . Precisely, if I a,0 = ∅, then the equilibrium points are x * = αv r . If I a,+ = ∅, then the equilibrium points are x * = 0. If I a,0 = ∅ and I a,+ = ∅, then all equilibrium points are x * = 0. Therefore, the results of this theorem under Assumption 2 can be derived by means of the method given above, but the actual derivation is skipped here. The proof of Theorem 2 is thus complete.
When the signed graph G(B) is undirected, we have that matrix E is symmetric and diagonalizable. Then we can obtain the following corollary from Theorem 2. Its proof is similar to that of Corollary 1, so it is omitted here. 
The stubborn neutrals scenario represents the situation that the neutral opinions cannot be altered, while the extreme opinions may be easily affected by other opinions. Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 establish the convergence of the generalized opinion dynamics (2) under different initial conditions for this scenario.
C. Stubborn Extremists Scenario
This subsection concentrates on the dynamic behavior of the generalized opinion dynamics (2) under the stubborn extremists scenario, that is, A(x) = (I − diag(x)
2 ). Theorem 3: Suppose that Assumption 1 (Assumption 2) holds, G(B) is the signed digraph, and there exists a positive diagonal matrix Γ = diag{γ 1 , · · · , γ N } such that H(ΓE) 0 and rankH(ΓE) = rankE. 2) If I a,0 = ∅, I a,+ = ∅, there exists a permutation matrix P such that the network (2) has the form of (4), E 22 is nonsingular, and
, where x * = P T y * , and y * is the equilibrium point of (4).
then every solution starting in {x | x i = −1, ∀i ∈ J , x i ∈ (−1, 1), ∀i / ∈ J } approaches − 1 ||vr||∞ v r . Proof: First, we consider the case under Assumption 1, and the partition of the state space is shown in Fig. 3 . If Assumption 1 holds, then 0 is a simple eigenvalue of E with a right positive eigenvector v r when σ i = ρ(B), ∀i = 1, · · · , N . When σ i = σ j > ρ(B), ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , all eigenvalues of E have negative real parts, and its dominant eigenvalue has the right positive eigenvector v r . 1) Let S(ε) = {x | −1+ε ≤ x i ≤ 1−ε}, where 0 < ε < 1. Introduce
For x ∈ S(ε), V (x) is positive definite, and the time derivative of V (x) along (13) is found to bė
Since H(ΓE) 0, we haveV ≤ 0. Hence, S(ε) is positively invariant with respect to (2) . (2) with initial condition x(0) ∈ S(ε) converges into P(ε). If x(0) is sufficiently close to 1 or −1,
∈ I a,0 }, where 0 < ε < 1. When x(0) ∈ S Ia,0 (ε), the solution of (2) satisfies |x i (t)| ≡ 1, ∀i ∈ I a,0 . P is a permutation matrix such that
where |y 1i | = 1, dim y 1 = |I a,0 |. Then the network (2) becomeṡ
|Ia,+| . The time derivative of V (s) along (15) is calculated as followṡ
|Ia,+| is positively invariant with respect to (15) . By LaSalle invariance principle, the solution of (15) 
∈ J }, where 0 < ε < 1. For x ∈ S 1 (ε), there exists a permutation matrix P such that the network (2) has the following forṁ
where y = P x = y 1 y 2 with y 1 = 1, dim y 1 = |J |. Then we can geṫ
Because v r = 1 and J = {j | v rj = ||v r || ∞ }, there exists a unique solution y * 2 such thatĒ 22 y * 2 +Ē 21 1 = 0. From a geometric point of view, the point
is the intersection point of the line αv r with (−1, 1] N . Similar to the arguments presented in 2), we can obtain that every solution starting in S 1 (ε) approaches x * = 1 ||vr||∞ v r . When ε → 0 + , we can have that every solution starting in {x |
with y 1 = −1, dim y 1 = |J |. Hence,
Because σ i = σ j = ρ(B), ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , v r = 1, there exists a unique solution y * 2 such thatĒ 22 y * 2 −Ē 21 1 = 0. From a geometric viewpoint, the point
is the intersection point of the line αv r with [−1, 1) N . Similar to 3), we can derive that every solution starting in {x |
Finally, we can adopt the similar methods presented above to get 1), 2), 3) and 4) under Assumption 2, and we omit details here. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
When the signed graph G(B) is undirected, the next corollary is an immediate result from Theorem 3. The proof is skipped here since it is similar to that of Corollary 1.
Corollary 3: Suppose that Assumption 1 (Assumption 2) holds and the signed graph G(B) is undirected. 2) If I a,0 = ∅, I a,+ = ∅, there exists a permutation matrix P such that the network (2) has the form of (4),Ē 22 is nonsingular, and
, ∀i / ∈ I a,0 }, where x * = P T y * , and y * is the equilibrium point of (4).
then every solution starting in {x | x i = −1, ∀i ∈ J , x i ∈ (−1, 1), ∀i / ∈ J } approaches − 1 ||vr||∞ v r . The stubborn extremists scenario illustrates the circumstance that the extreme opinions cannot be persuaded by other opinions, while the other opinions are readily changed. This scenario is adequate when there exists two competitive extreme opinions, such as two opposite political parties. In this scenario it is demonstrated in Theorem 3 and Corollary 3 that the generalized opinion dynamics (2) has the assured convergence under different initial conditions.
D. Further Discussion
In this subsection, we will discuss several important aspects of the results derived in the preceding subsections.
Remark 1: For different state-dependent susceptibility, the dynamical behaviors of the generalized opinion model (2) are very different. It can be seen from the proofs of Theorem 1-Theorem 3 that the number of equilibrium points is different for different state-dependent susceptibility. Specifically, the number of equilibrium points is smallest in the stubborn neutrals scenario, while the number of equilibrium points is biggest in the stubborn extremists scenario. As a result, distinctive Lyapunov functions (compare (5), (8), (10), (11), (12), (13), (16)) are constructed to effectively handle these different scenarios with a view to proving the convergence of the generalized opinion dynamics (2).
Remark 2: If for each x 0 ∈ R n , there exists T > 0 such that x ∈ R n + or x ∈ R n − ∀t ≥ T , then the system is said to achieve an unanimous opinion. Our Theorem 1-Theorem 3 reveal that the network (2) achieves a unanimous opinion. Moreover, although all agents achieve a unanimous opinion, the degree of opinion for each agent is different when the right positive eigenvector v r = 1.
Remark 3: In Theorem 1-Theorem 3, one may use the condition "E is real orthogonally diagonalizable" to replace the condition "H(ΓE) 0 and rankH(ΓE) = rankE." Because E is real orthogonally diagonalizable, there exists a real orthogonal matrix U such that U EU T is a diagonal matrix. By Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, we have that H(E) 0 and rankH(E) = rankE.
Remark 4: If the signed graph G(B) is undirected, then matrix E is a real symmetric matrix and orthogonally diagonalizable. If the signed graph G(B) is directed and B is real orthogonally diagonalizable, then matrix E is orthogonally diagonalizable.
Remark 5: If matrix E is not symmetric, then it is not easy to verify whether the matrix is real orthogonally diagonalizable. However, by using the Matlab LMI (linear matrix inequality) toolbox, it is straightforward to find a positive diagonal matrix Γ such that H(ΓE) 0 and rankH(E) = rankE. See Example 2 in next section for details.
Remark 6: For a special class of matrices, there exists a positive diagonal matrix Γ such that H(ΓE) 0. If σ i = σ j > ρ(B), ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , and B ≥ 0, then E = B − Σ is a nonsingular M-matrix. It is known from the property of M-matrices [40] that there exists a positive diagonal matrix Γ such that H(ΓE) ≺ 0. Moreover, rankH(E) = rankE.
Remark 7: Unlike the model in [38] , our model requires that all eigenvalues of matrix E have non-positive real parts. If there exists an eigenvalue of E which has the positive real part, then the evolution of one agent may approach infinity as time goes to infinity. This will contradict the assumption in the stubborn neutrals scenario A(x) = diag(x) 2 . Moreover, in practice, the opinion about a specific matter should be measured as a finite number rather than infinity.
Remark 8: The major difference between our work and [24] is that the work in this paper can deal with antagonistic interactions in social networks. Moreover, the model in this paper is more general than the one in [24] . For example, all eigenvalues of matrix E may have negative real parts in our model. However, when all interactions among agents are cooperative, our results may be more conservative than those in [24] , especially in the case of directed graphs.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
This section will provide two examples to illustrate the effectiveness of the theoretical results. The first example comes from the real-world, that is, Zachary's Karate Club [42] , while the second example is taken from [38] .
Example 1: In [42] , Zachary studied the relationships in a karate club, and obtained some results about fission. The club consists of 34 members. There are two important persons in the club: one is the club president John A., and the other is Mr. Hi who is a part-time karate instructor. There is an conflict between John A., and Mr. Hi over the price of karate lessons. As the instructor, Mr. Hi wishes to raise prices. However, as the club's chief administrator, John A. wishes to stabilize prices. Assume that the viewpoint of John A. is 1, the viewpoint of Mr. Hi is −1, and the viewpoint of other members is included in [−1, 1]. In [24] , the three scenarios were studied, that is, stubborn positives scenario A(x) = 0.5(I − diag(x)), stubborn neutrals scenario A(x) = diag(x) 2 , and stubborn extremists scenario A(x) = (I − diag (x) 2 ). However, antagonistic interactions among 34 members are also likely, but were not considered in [24] . In this example, we assume that there exist three pairs of antagonistic interactions, that is, Members 1 and 2, Members 1 and 32, and Members 33 and 34. We examine three different scenarios, that is, stubborn positives scenario, stubborn neutrals scenario, and stubborn extremists scenario. Fig. 6 displays the evolution of each person's viewpoint in the stubborn extremists scenario. In particular, when there exist i, j such that x i (0) = 1, x j (0) = −1, the evolutions of these persons' viewpoint are unable to attain the same opinion, as seen from Fig. 6(d) . Note that this phenomenon cannot be deduced from Theorem 3, which is left for future research.
Example 2: Consider the opinion dynamicṡ
where B is the adjacency matrix of signed digraph G(B), and such that H(ΓE) 0 and rankH(ΓE) = rankE. Fig. 7-Fig. 9 plot the evolution curves of each agent under the stubborn positives scenario A(x) = 0.5(I − diag(x)), the stubborn neutrals scenario A(x) = diag(x) 2 , and the stubborn extremists scenario A(x) = (I − diag(x)
2 ), respectively. So Fig. 7-Fig. 9 illustrate the results of Theorem 1-Theorem 3, respectively.
It is interesting to note that system (19) exhibits some new behaviors when compared with the following linear model given in [38] :
For example, as pointed out in [38, Example 2] , the states of (20) hold to the orthant pair R 3 −,+ . However, when
2 , the states of (19) hold to the orthant when A(x) = (I − diag(x) 2 ), every solution starting in {x | x i = 1, ∀i ∈ J , x i ∈ (−1, 1), ∀i / ∈ J } approaches v c , where J = {3} (see Fig. 9(b) ). And every solution starting in {x | x i = −1, ∀i ∈ J , x i ∈ (−1, 1), ∀i / ∈ J } approaches −v c (see Fig. 9(c) ).
V. CONCLUSION
A generalized nonlinear opinion dynamics with statedependent susceptibility to persuasion and antagonistic interactions has been introduced in this paper. The introduced model has been comprehensively analyzed, particularly with a thorough investigation into three specializations of statedependent susceptibility drawn from the existing literature. The main theoretical analysis tools adopted have been PerronFrobenius property of eventually positive matrix and LaSalle invariance principle. It has been shown that all agents of the opinion network converge into the subspace spanned by the positive eigenvector of an eventually positive matrix. Generally speaking, all entries of the positive eigenvector are not the same unless the eventually positive matrix is a Laplacian matrix. Therefore, the obtained results can represent different levels of an opinion, which is a common phenomenon in social networks. Finally, in this paper, it has been assumed that all eigenvalues of the system matrix are non-positive. An interesting topic for future work will be to study the case that there does not exist any restriction on eigenvalues of a network matrix. 
APPENDIX A SIGNED GRAPHS
Let G = (V, E, B) denote a weighted directed signed graph (signed digraph), where V = {1, 2, · · · , N } is the set of all nodes, E ∈ V × V is the set of edges, and B is an adjacency matrix which assigns real numbers to the edges. Let G(B) denote a graph with adjacency matrix B. An edge (i, j) ∈ E is directed from node i to node j. The entry b ij > 0 (or < 0) is the weight corresponding to the edge (i, j). Define A directed path (length l−1) is a sequence of directed edges of the form (i 1 , i 2 ), (i 2 , i 3 ), · · · , (i l1 , i l ) with distinct nodes. A signed digraph has a spanning tree if there is a root node, which has directed paths to all other nodes. A signed digraph is said to be strongly connected if there is a directed path between any two distinct nodes. G(B) is strongly connected if and only if B is irreducible. 
